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CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE

BULLETIN



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25X Approved For Release 2002/09/04: CIA-RDP79T00975Ab04000200001-4 25X1 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 4 October 1958 DAILY BRIEF 25X1 I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC Hungary-US: Budapest is stiffening its policy toward the 25X1 United States. The deputy foreign minister warned the US Legation on 2 October that, in response to "slanderous" attacks against Hungary by US Government representatives, Hungary would henceforth follow a more restrictive policy in granting visas, and he implied that the legation might be requested to reduce its staff. 25X (Page 4) i

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Pridi can solve Thailand's economic ills. (Page 7)	
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DAILY BRIEF

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Hungary Stiffens Policy Toward the US

The acting Hungarian foreign minister warned the American charge in Budapest on 2 October that the Hungarian Government "could not much longer tolerate slanderous attacks" by American representatives. The minister charged the United States with discrimination in issuing visas to Hungarians and said that henceforth Hungary would follow a more restrictive policy in visa matters. He referred to "such a large staff" at the US Legation—a clear threat that if American criticism of Hungary continues, the legation might be requested to reduce its staff. The US staff in Budapest is twice as large as its Hungarian counterpart in Washington. The charge considers that, while Hungary may not now be contemplating a complete break in relations with the United States, the possibility of an eventual break cannot be ruled out.

The legation has recently noted an increase in surveillance and other harassing tactics against its personnel. Although there were some signs in the spring that the Hungarians wanted to improve relations, their policy toward the West and specifically toward the United States has hardened, particularly since the execution of Nagy and the resultant world clamor.

Hungarian party (Nagy and the resultant world clamor. thief Kadar recently returned from a bloc where he was given strict orders to adopt on toward the United States than that of	-
other bloc countries,		
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II. ASIA-AFRICA

British Leftist Lawyer in Iraq

British left-wing lawyer Denis N. Pritt, generally considered a Communist, is in Iraq as a guest of the government, presumably as an adviser on international oil relations. He had previously been consulted by the Iraqi Government during a renegotiation of the Iraq Petroleum Company concession contract which followed the favorable terms Iran obtained after nationalization of Iran's oil.

A member of Parliament from 1935 to 1950, Pritt was

pelled from the Labor party in 1940 but continued to represent s constituency as an independent Laborite until defeated in the	
50 general elections. He has a long record of defending	
ommunists, principally through his active participation in the	
o-Communist International Association of Democratic Lawyers,	
d maintains active membership in the British Peace Committee	
d the World Peace Council. Pritt also defended Mau-Mau leader	_
mo Kenyatta.	4

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Cyprus

The marked increase in violence throughout Cyprus will probably be further accelerated as a result of Archbishop Makarios' instruction to the Greek Cypriots to resist 'firmly' implementation of the British plan. At least two British women have been shot—one fatally—and there have been numerous armed attacks on security force vehicles. Arson, sabotage, and bombing attacks are also increasing.

In Athens, the Karamanlis government is under growing pressure to resign, and heavily armed police are patrolling the streets to prevent outbreaks of anti-British and anti-Turkish rioting. Minor clashes have occurred between police and demonstrating Greek students, and Greek labor organizations have called for a general strike to protest British moves on Cyprus.

Prospects remain dim that the NAC, during its meeting on 6 October, can arrive at a compromise which would open the way for tripartite talks concerning Cyprus. The Turks now insist they will have no part in discussing any Spaak proposals. Greek Foreign Minister Averoff has stated that Athens might accept a modified form of the British plan if it were agreed beforehand that a plebiscite on the question of independence, with both enosis and partition precluded, would be held in seven to ten years, but London almost certainly would reject such a proposal.

Possibility of Former Premier Pridi's Return to Thailand

The American Embassy in Bangkok notes with concern recent reports suggesting that Marshal Sarit, despite his protestations to the contrary, may be toying with the idea of permitting former Premier Pridi to return to Thailand. Even after his long absence as a political exile in Communist China, Pridi probably still enjoys some popularity as one of the founders of modern Thailand.

Several persons within Sarit's inner circle are known to be Pridi supporters. They are reportedly working assiduously to convince Sarit that Pridi is not a Communist, that he could help solve Thailand's economic problems, and that it would be desirable in terms of domestic politics for him to return. The arguments may be gradually gaining acceptance with Sarit, who is increasingly troubled by his inability to provide effective government.

There are still serious legal and political obstacles to Pridi's return, however. He is under a legal cloud because of his alleged implication in the regicide case of 1946, and the present King is known to be violently opposed to his return, as are Premier Thanom and other military followers of Sarit. Sarit is also aware that Pridi's return would be viewed with alarm in the West, where it would be interpreted as a softening of Thailand's

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anti-Communist posture.	
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